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Melissa G. Liazost
States have regulated charities for at least the past four hundred
years.' Such regulations protect charitable institutions by ensuring that
only legitimate charitable organizations receive the tax and other
benefits accorded to nonprofits with a public purpose.2 They also pro-
tect consumers from fraud and abuse.' State regulations seek to pre-
vent the "fraud and unethical behavior [that is commonly reported] in
[the] daily newspapers. ' 4 Solicitation laws further aim to protect the
public interest and provide a source of information on charities.!
Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia require charities to
register in-state and file financial and other information prior to solic-
iting in those states.
Charities have expanded their traditional fundraising methods
and are increasingly raising significant amounts of money through the
Internet. In one month in 1999, the Red Cross raised over $1 million
online to aid Kosovo refugees. World Vision, a Christian humanitar-
ian group that sends relief workers throughout the world and spon-
t B.A. 1996, Harvard College; J.D. Candidate 2001,The University of Chicago.
1 See Acte to redresse the Misemployment of Landes Goodes and Stockes of Money
heretofore given to Charitable Uses ("Statute of Charitable Uses"), 43 Eliz ch 4 (1601) (permit-
ting bishops and commissioners to inquire into the uses of charitable funds).
2 See Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") § 501(c)(3), codified at 26 USC § 501(c)(3) (1994)
(describing various allowable public purposes for nonprofit corporations and the requirements
they must meet to qualify for tax exemption).
3 See Village of Schaumburg v Citizens for a Better Government, 444 US 620, 636-38
(1980) (stating that government entities may enforce their substantial interests in protecting the
public from fraudulent, criminal, and annoying charitable solicitations through regulating solici-
tations, as long as government regulation does not merely peripherally promote these interests
and does not "unnecessarily interfer[e] with First Amendment freedoms").
4 Avner Ben-Ner and Theresa Van Hoomissen, The Governance of Nonprofit Organiza-
tions: Law and Public Policy, 4 Nonprofit Management & Leadership 393, 393 (1994) (citing
nonprofit fraud cases of "Jim and Tammy Bakker at PTL (Praise The Lord), William Aramony
of the United Way, and New York State Blue Cross and Blue Shield").
5 See David E. Ormstedt, State Authority to Regulate Charitable Solicitation, 287 PL/Tax
67,69 (1989).
6 See <http:llwww.nonprofitsorgllibrarylgov/urs> (visited Mar 4,2000) (including a list of
states that require charitable solicitors to register, and a list of states that use the Uniform Regis-
tration Statement).
7 See Leslie Miller, Charity Begins on Line: Nonprofit Groups Raise Millions Without
Phone Calls or Junk Mail, USA Today 6D (May 5,1999).
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sors children, raises over $183,000 per month on the web." Fundraising
online is not limited to efforts by charities themselves. Internet auc-
tion sites have organized fundraisers for charities, and other web sites
donate a percentage of their sales to charity.! Estimates suggest that
three and a half million people have already used the Internet to
make a charitable contribution." It is also possible to donate to a char-
ity through an umbrella web site such as www.guidestar.org or
www.helping.org, even though the recipient charity may not solicit on
the web or even maintain a web page." The expansion of online solici-
tation has also greatly increased possibilities for consumer fraud.
The increased use of the Internet for fundraising presents the is-
sue of whether a charity that raises money via a web site will be re-
quired to register in every jurisdiction where its web site is accessible.
Some states have indicated that they believe charities that solicit on-
line must register in their states. As early as 1995, state officials in
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania took the po-
sition that online fundraising was covered by their respective statutory
definitions of solicitation, thus potentially requiring registration." The
Illinois and Minnesota Attorneys General's offices have actively pur-
sued online violators of their respective state laws. 4 States currently
pursuing and fining unregistered nonprofits that solicit online include
South Carolina, Florida, and Pennsylvania." While no state regulators
have yet demanded that charities soliciting in their state solely via a
web site register, this is mainly because Internet solicitation remains
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See Joellen Perry, Charities Solicit Online With Pitches and Fruitcakes, US News &
World Rep 78 (Nov 29,1999).
11 See <http:lwww.guidestar.orggivelindex.html> (visited Feb 10, 2000) and
<http://www.helping.org> (visited Feb 10, 2000). These sites enable their visitors to search a da-
tabase of charities and to chose an organization to which to donate. With Guidestar, for example,
the entire value of a donation, less a processing fee of not more than 2 percent, is transferred to
the charity. The costs of the Guidestar web site are borne by the AOL Foundation. A search of
these sites revealed that it is possible to make an online donation to a charity, for example Op-
eration Aware of Tulsa, Oklahoma, that does not maintain its own web page and therefore can-
not solicit on its own via the Internet.
12 Charles A. Jaffe, Check Their Line: Resist the Lure of Charities Until You Have a Chance
to Investigate, Chi Trib 1 (Dec 22, 1999) (noting that while the Internet has given consumers
more options for charitable donations, it has also "made it equally easy for scam artists to hit on
consumers").
13 See Betsy Hill Bush, Internet Solicitation: Registration Required, The Nonprofit Times 26
(July 1995).
14 See Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 Conn L Rev 1095,1096 (1996).
15 See Ali Woolwich, Review of an Internet Fundraising Seminar, Nonprofit Online News,
available online at <http:llwww.gilbert.org/news/featureslfeatureOO21.html> (visited Feb 10,
2000) (including a review of seminar for nonprofits on strategies for raising money online, and
noting that South Carolina, Florida, and Pennsylvania are currently pursuing and fining non-
registered online solicitors).
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so new-not because regulators believe that registration requirements
do not apply.6 Many regulators have indicated that they will interpret
current state registration laws to apply to online solicitors.
7
While states routinely impose their registration requirements on
out-of-state charities that solicit in-state in "real space,' 9. the Internet
poses new challenges for states and charities in this arena.'9 Charities
that solicit contributions via a web site face the possibility of having to
register in every jurisdiction in the United States that so requires,
which would pose a significant burden on their ability to operate, es-
pecially for smaller charities with limited resources. Furthermore,
state attempts to regulate out-of-state charities that solicit via the
Internet may raise federal-state dormant Commerce Clause concerns,
as well as state-to-state Commerce Clause concerns relating to states
regulating commerce outside of their borders and leading to conflict-
ing state regimes. Faced with the new medium of the Internet, com-
mentators have argued that states both can'0 and cannot2 ' regulate the
16 See <http://www.muridae.com/nporegulation/foreign..solicitation.html> (visited March
4,2000).
17 See id.
18 See, for example, the Minnesota Attorney General's home page, which includes a data-
base of charities registered to solicit in-state and enables one to search the database by state.
<http://www.ag.state.mn.us/cgi-bin/charitysearch.taf> (visited March 4, 2000). A search under
"CA" revealed that there are 121 California charities registered in Minnesota; a search under
"NY" revealed 151 charities from New York registered in Minnesota. The database indicates
that charities from forty states and the District of Columbia are registered in Minnesota.
19 States traditionally have been the locus of charitable regulation, although the federal
government has played a role as well. See, for example, IRC § 501(c)(3) (providing tax exemp-
tion for qualifying charitable organizations). There have been past proposals for the federal gov-
ernment to play an even larger role in this area. The Filer Commission, under the rubric of the
United States Treasury, proposed establishing a national supervisory agency to oversee nonprof-
its in 1977. See Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Commentary on Com-
mission Recommendations, in 1 Filer Commission Research Papers 3,38 (Treasury Dept 1977).
These have included proposals to regulate aspects of solicitation, including proposals to require
exempt organizations to disclose the percentage of funds raised that are spent on exemptpur-
poses and to require professional fundraisers to reveal the percent of the money they collected
that went to costs. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy.Abandoning the Quest
for Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S Cal L Rev 605,672 (1991).
2) Consider Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv
L Rev 501,506 (1999) ("[W]hile particular versions of cyberspace do resist effective regulation,
it does not follow that every version of cyberspace does so as well.... WTlhere are versions of cy-
berspace where behavior can be regulated, and the government can take steps to increase this
regulability."); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U Chi L Rev 1199, 1200-01 (1998)
(arguing that regulation of cyberspace is feasible; states have adapted their regulatory regimes to
technological innovations in the past and can do so in the context of the Internet); James Boyle,
Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U Cin L Rev 177,
178 (1997) ("[Ihe state can often use privatized enforcement and state-backed technologies to
evade some of the supposed practical (and constitutional) restraints on the exercise of legal
power over the Internet").
21 Consider John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 Harv
Intl L J 207, 208 (1997) (contending that Internet regulations imposed by the United States and
other countries will be ineffective); Burk, 28 Con L Rev at 1096-97 (cited in note 14) (arguing
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Internet, although they have not necessarily made normative claims
about whether states should do so.
Despite potential concerns regarding jurisdiction, the dormant
Commerce Clause, and inconsistent regulation, charities, like other
organizations that conduct transactions online, should not be able to
escape regulation and consumer protection Statutes simply by virtue
of the fact that they operate on the web. This Comment argues that it
is feasible and desirable for states to regulate online solicitors in their
jurisdictions in order to continue to police consumer fraud, that chari-
ties that obtain the benefits of solicitation should bear the burdens as-
sociated with such activity, and that such regulation would not violate
the affirmative or the dormant Commerce Clause.
Part I provides an overview of the development of state and fed-
eral supervision of charities, with a particular focus on solicitation
laws. This Part demonstrates that although the federal government
does regulate charities in some respects, states serve as the primary
regulators of charities' solicitation efforts. Part II examines questions
of personal jurisdiction, Commerce Clause concerns, and federal pol-
icy in the context of the Internet. It demonstrates that states should be
able to obtain jurisdiction over a nonprofit organization whose only
connection to the forum state is an online solicitation; and in addition,
because there is no discrimination in such regulation, it asserts that
many traditional Commerce Clause concerns are alleviated. Part III
argues that there should be regulation of online solicitations and that
this is best done by states, since they have the strongest interest in
protecting their citizens from fraud. Part IV proposes how to facilitate
this regulation.
I. HISTORY OFTHE REGULATION OF CHARITIES AND SOLICITATION
States are almost exclusively responsible for overseeing charities,
with the goal of "minimiz[ing] opportunities for deceptive fundrais-
ing. ' The federal government's role is generally limited to establish-
ing contribution incentive? and requiring the disclosure of informa-
that Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause sig-
nificantly limit states' abilities to regulate online activities); David R. Johnson and David Post,
Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan L Rev 1367,1367 (1996) (arguing
that the Internet defies territorial regulation and that authorities should therefore defer to self-
regulation in cyberspace); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-making in Cyber-
space, 45 Emory L J 911, 921-23 (1996) (stating that current American regulatory paradigms are
too narrowly targeted to regulate effectively the Internet).
22 Developments in the Law: Nonprofit Corporations, 105 Harv L Rev 1578,1636 (1992).
23 Id. State governments provide contribution incentives as well.
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tion that ensures that only truly charitable organizations receive the
benefits of tax exemption.'
Significantly, state law has evolved to require all charities that so-
licit in the state to register there. These statutes are aimed at protect-
ing the public from fraud and abuse. Various portions of solicitation
statutes have been struck down over the years, limiting states' ability
to police fraud. However, this policing remains an essential goal of
state regulation. The federal government is only involved in charitable
supervision through the Internal Revenue Service, although there
have been (unsuccessful) proposals in the past to expand the federal
government's role in this area.
A. State Regulation
Governments have regulated charitable organizations for almost
four hundred years, beginning with the Statute of Charitable Uses in
England in 1601. 2' In the early United States-in fact, up until the
1900s-charities existed mainly in trust form and were supervised at
the local level.26 Early on, the Supreme Court held that charitable cor-
porations were to be treated the same as private corporations, which
protected charitable corporations from state interference with their
charters." Otherwise, the state could have altered a charity's charter as
it desired, potentially discouraging donors.2 While many charities ex-
isted as trusts, incorporation became an increasingly popular form of
charitable organization in the early 1900s.2 Trusts are limited by the
Rule Against Perpetuities, and thus in the income they can accumu-
late, while charitable corporations are not; further, founders and direc-
tors of charitable corporations tend to have far more autonomy than
do trustees.' A state's cy pres powers also do not reach charitable cor-
porations.3 Thus, with the rise of incorporation as a form of charitable
organization, states lost some of the tools they had used to police
24 See IRC § 501.
25 43 Eliz ch 4 (1601).
26 See Espinoza, 64 S Cal L Rev at 636-38 (cited in note 19) (noting barriers to regulation
of trusts by state attorneys general); James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corpora-
tion Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 Emory L J 617, 619 (1985). Although charitable trusts
are still the predominant form of charitable organization in England, charitable trusts and cor-
porations are treated very similarly there, leading in essence to a uniform law. See Fishman, 34
Emory L J at 619-21.
27 See Fishman, 34 Emory L J at 642 (cited in note 26).
28 Id.
29 See Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 Vill L Rev 433,
475 (1996) (noting the divergence in American and English charities laws as American charities
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charities and potential fraud. By the 1950s, three-fourths of all founda-
tions were incorporated.
In 1943, New Hampshire passed the first statute requiring chari-
ties to report to the state Attorney General. By 1959, twenty-one
states had statutes that regulated charities in a similar manner." Such
statutes gained widespread support, for they ensured that only legiti-
mate charitable organizations received the benefits granted to non-
profit organizations with a public purpose. In the early 1960s, the
Hamlin Committee, formed by the Rockefeller Foundation and pri-
vate citizens, issued a report supporting state regulations that required
financial reporting by charitable organizations to a central state
3,
agency.
Prior to 1980, most state charitable solicitation statutes contained
three elements: "(1) registration and reporting requirements for solic-
iting charities and fundraising professionals; (2) prohibitions against
fraud and misrepresentation, including required disclosures; and (3)
stringent limitations on fundraising costs."' Limits on ftndraising
costs were enacted in response to an exponential growth in solicita-
tion after World War II that was made possible by advances in com-
munication and technology. Such advances, however, also increased
the possibilities for fraud and inefficiency, in a process somewhat
analogous to the growth of the Internet today.
However, states encountered difficulties in drafting charitable so-
licitation statutes that could withstand constitutional challenge. In Vil-
lage of Schaumburg v Citizens for a Better Government,n the Supreme
Court struck down as invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments an ordinance that prohibited door-to-door canvassing unless at
32 See Espinoza, 64 S Cal L Rev at 642 (cited in note 19). For a model of nonprofit incor-
poration laws, see the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (ABA 1987). "The original
Model Non-profit Corporation Act was approved by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law of the American Bar Association in 1952."
Lizabeth A. Moody, The Who, What, and How of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act,
16 N Ky L Rev 251,251 (1989). State attorneys general have authority over nonprofit corpora-
tions through the not-for-profit corporation laws and over charitable trusts through laws relating
to charitable trusts. They have general authority over charities through the registration and re-
porting laws, as well as laws that give the attorney general authority over specified events in the
life cycle of the nonprofit. Harriet Bograd, The Role of State Attorneys General in Relation to
Troubled Nonprofits 22 (Yale Inst for Soc & Pol Stud 1994).
33 See An Act Establishing A Register of Public Trusts, 1943 NH Laws 181 (authorizing the
Attorney General to establish and maintain a registry of public trusts).
34 Espinoza, 64 S Cal L Rev at 648 & n 204 (cited in note 19).
35 See id at 649-51, citing Robert H. Hamlin, ed, Voluntary Health and Welfare Agencies in
the United States:An Exploratory Study by an Ad Hoc Citizens Committee i-ii, 2-37 (1961).
36 Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, State Regulation of Charitable Solicitation, 12 Prob & Prop
48,48 (July-Aug 1998).
37 See Espinoza, 64 S Cal L Rev at 635 (cited in note 19).
38 444 US 620 (1980).
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least 75 percent of the money raised went directly to charitable activi-
ties." The Court found that the 75 percent requirement did not serve
any legitimate government interest, such as protecting public safety or
preventing fraud." While states can regulate charities to protect these
interests, the Court reiterated that charitable solicitation is protected
First Amendment speech.1
After Citizens for a Better Government, a number of states kept
their percentage limits on administrative costs, but amended their
statutes to allow a charity to demonstrate that administrative costs in
excess of the statutory limits were reasonable.' However, in Secretary
of State of Maryland v Joseph H. Munson Co, Inc; the Supreme Court
struck down a solicitation statute with just such a waiver provision.'
Due to the Court's rulings in Citizens for a Better Government and
Munson, states lost the ability to use percentage limits to protect do-
nors and to maximize the productivity of the charitable sector.4
Following Munson, the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral ("NAAG") and the National Association of State Charity Offi-
cials ("NASCO") formulated A ModelAct Concerning the Solicitation
of Funds For Charitable Purposes." The Model Act aimed to encour-
age "uniform, fair, and effective legislation regarding charitable solici-
tations."4' The Act was also drafted in part "to address the Supreme
Court's first amendment concerns elaborated in Citizens for a Better
Government and Munson.'"4 The Model Act requires all charitable or-
ganizations that are not exempt to register in a state prior to soliciting
there." The Act places greater registration and reporting requirements
on professional fundraisers than on nonprofessional fundraisers." The
39 Id at 622.
40 Id at 636-38.
41 Id at 632.
42 See Wilson, 12 Prob & Prop at 49 (cited in note 36).
43 467 US 947 (1984).
44 Id at 949-50.
45 See Espinoza, 64 S Cal L Rev at 607-08 (cited in note 19) (describing goals of statutes
limiting fundraising costs).
46 National Association of Attorneys General Committee on Trusts and Solicitations, A
Model Act Concerning the Solicitation of Funds for Charitable Purposes ("Model Act") (Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General 1986), available online at <http://www.muridae.conm
nporegulation/documents/model_solicitationsact.html> (visited Feb 11, 2000).
47 Private Sector Advisory Group to the NAAG/NASCO Model Solicitations Law Project,
Resolution, passed Oct 7, 1986, available online at <http://www.muridae.com/nporegulation/
documents/model_solicitationsact.html> (visited March 4,2000).
48 Wilson, 12 Prob & Prop at 50 (cited in note 36).
49 Model Act § 2(a) (cited in note 46). Exempt groups include political parties, political ac-
tion committees, political candidates, persons exempt from filing annual federal information re-
turns under the Internal Revenue Code, groups that raise less than a set amount of money, and
groups that have less than ten donors, no employees, and do not pay for fundraising assistance.
Id at § 4(a)-(c).
50 Id at § 6. Even at the time of the approval of the Model Act by NAAG, an advisory
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Act also defines solicitation broadly,5' although it does not mention
the Internet, as the Model Act was written prior to the Internet's
widespread use. The Act does not define where a solicitation occurs,
though states may find that a solicitation occurs where the consumer
receives it.-" The Model Act is the basis for most state charitable solici-
tation law.53
In 1988, in Riley v National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina, Inc, the Supreme Court struck down a portion of North
Carolina's charitable registration statute, which, though passed prior
to the Model Act, was similar to Section 6 of the Act.5 Specifically, the
Court invalidated three provisions under the First Amendment: (1) a
prior registration requirement imposed on professional solicitors that
did not apply to nonprofessional solicitors, (2) a requirement that pro-
fessional fundraisers disclose their percentage of compensation from
previous campaigns, and (3) a percentage requirement, with a waiver
provision, on how much money raised must go directly to charity."
Once again, the Court expressly held that charitable solicitation is
protected as First Amendment speech." However, the Court failed to
distinguish between charitable programming (the day-to-day services
that the charity provides) and requests for money. The two do not
necessarily deserve the same level of deference nor do they merit the
same regulatory treatment.
Despite Riley, other parts of the Model Act that are not related
to the invalidated North Carolina statute remain viable and several
group expressed strong concern over Section 6(e)(1)(B), which required paid solicitors to dis-
close, when requesting a contribution, that only a fixed percentage of the revenues raised would
go to charity. Private Sector Advisory Group, Resolution (cited in note 47). The Supreme Court
later invalidated a North Carolina statute that contained provisions similar to this and other
provisions of Section 6 in Riley v National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 US 781
(1988). See text accompanying notes 54-56.
51 Model Act § 1(c) (cited in note 46). Specifically, the Act defines solicit or solicitation to
mean "the request directly or indirectly for money, credit, property, financial assistance, or other
thing of any kind or value on the plea or representation that such money, credit, property, finan-
cial assistance, or other thing of any kind or value, or any portion thereof, will be used for a
chaiitable purpose or benefit a charitable organization." Id.
52 For example, Arkansas law states that a "'[s]olicitation' shall be deemed to occur when
the request is made, at the place the request is received, whether or not the person making the
same actually receives any contribution." Act to Regulate the Solicitation of Charitable Funds in
Arkansas, Ark Code Ann Act 1198 § 1(13) (Lexis Advance Legislative Service 1999). See also
Wilson, 12 Prob & Prop at 51 (cited in note 36) (justifying this approach as the best method of
protecting consumers).
-3 Wilson, 12 Prob & Prop at 52 (cited in note 36) ("[M]ost charitable solicitation statutes
have the common heritage of the Model Act.").
54 487 US 781 (1988).
55 See id at 784.
56 See id at 785-87.
57 See id at 787-88.
58 See Espinoza, 64 S Cal L Rev at 625 (cited in note 19).
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states have adopted them. Significantly, the Model Act contains a re-
ciprocity provision that enables officials in one state to accept infor-
mation filed by a charity in another state in lieu of a separate filing."
A number of states have adopted this provision,6' and NAAG and
NASCO have developed a uniform registration form that most states
currently use,1 enabling charities to avoid duplicate filings.
Currently, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia require
charitable organizations that intend to solicit contributions in-state to
register with state officials and to report specified information prior to
solicitation.62 The Model Act defines "contribution" as the "grant,
promise or pledge of money, credit, property, financial assistance or
other thing of any kind or value in response to a solicitation."' Most
states follow this definition or have a more narrow one. ' Some states
require registration and reporting by all charities, while some require
it only of those that solicit funds." Some states define charitable or-
ganizations to include only those that do business or hold property in
the state,6 although at what point solicitation constitutes "doing busi-
ness" is unclear.
Further, while the Model Act defines charitable organizations to
include tax-exempt organizations as well as self-described charitable
groups,67 some states have eliminated this latter portion from their
definition of charitable organizations, requiring only groups that are
in fact charitable to register.6 These states typically require charities
to register with a designated state official, pay a filing fee, and disclose
financial and other information prior to soliciting donations in that
state.6' The designated official is usually the Secretary of State or the
Attorney General.7 Registration and reporting is a central function of
59 Model Act § 11 (cited in note 46).
60 Wilson, 12 Prob & Prop at 53 (cited in note 36). See, for example, Mass Ann Laws ch 68,
§ 27 (Law Co-op 1999), which allows the state charities division to "accept information filed by a
charitable organization with the appropriate authority of another state or of the United States in
lieu of the information required to be filed" in Massachusetts.
61 See Wilson, 12 Prob & Prop at 53 (cited in note 36).
62 See <http:llwww.nonprofits.orgllibrarygovlurs> (visited Mar 4,2000).
63 Model Act § l(e) (cited in note 46).
64 See, for example, Alaska Stat § 45.68.900(2) (1999), which defines "contributions" as
"contributions of money or property."
65 Bograd, The Role of State Attorneys General at 24 (cited in note 32).
66 Wilson, 12 Prob & Prop at 53 (cited in note 36).
67 Model Act § 1(a)(1)-(2) (cited in note 46).
68 Wilson, 12 Prob & Prop at 53 (cited in note 36).
69 See, for example, NY Executive Law § 172 (McKinney 1993 & Supp 1999); Conn Gen
Stat Ann § 21a-190b-c (West 1994).
70 See Bograd, The Role of State Attorneys General at 22-24 (cited in note 32).
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charity offices." A number of smaller municipal subdivisions, including
cities and counties, have charitable solicitation statutes as well.2
Although the legal status of soliciting donations via a web page is
uncertain, the consequences of soliciting in a state without meeting
the state's registration and reporting requirements are clear and can
be severe. States may be awarded civil penalties by a court of up to
$10,000 for each violation of their solicitation statutes.2 The Illinois
Attorney General's office is suing a charity that solicited in-state mon-
ies without registering (and that used only $461 of $205,031 raised for
charitable purposes) for $205,000 in compensatory damages and
$205,000 in punitive damages.U If an unregistered charity solicits in
New York, the state may assess damages equal to the entire amount of
funds solicited without an offset for fundraising expenses incurred by
the charity." If a fundraiser uses unregistered solicitors, a jurisdiction
may issue a temporary restraining order barring all solicitation by that
fundraiser. '
B. Federal Involvement
While states remain responsible for most charitable regulation
and policing fraud, the federal government plays a role as well
through contribution incentives and required information disclosure.
Beginning in 1942, Congress required tax-exempt organizations to file
information disclosures with the Internal Revenue Service.7 Since
1996, Congress also has required tax-exempt groups to mail their ex-
emption application (IRS Form 1023) and last three annual returns
(IRS Form 990 or 990-PF) promptly to those who request it.78 A char-
71 See id.
72 See, for example, International Society for Krishna Consciousness of Houston, Inc v City
of Houston, 689 F2d 541,543-44 (5th Cir 1982) (upholding the constitutionality of a typical city
registration requirement); American Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc v Pi-
nellas County, 32 F Supp 2d 1308, 1311-12 (M D Fla 1998) (upholding county ordinance that re-
quired charities to register with the county, pay an application fee, maintain specific records, and
comply with reporting requirements).
73 The state may also obtain an injunction, restitution, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs
of investigation and litigation. Model Act § 17(e) (cited in note 46).
74 Maura Kelly, Little of Mission's Money Went to Homeless, Suit Says, Chi Trib 5 (Mar 8,
2000).
75 David G. Samuels, Registration of Charitable Groups and Fund Raisers, NY L J 1 (Aug
29, 1995), citing Abrams v Pacific West Cancer Fund, No 46578-88 (NY Sup Ct, NY County Dee
13,1989).
76 Samuels, NY L J at 1 (cited in note 75), citing People v Upstate New York Veterans Out-
reach Association, No 13095-91 (NY Sup Ct, Monroe County June 22,1995).
77 See Brody, 41 Vill L Rev at 486 (cited in note 29).
78 See id; Gioia M. Ellingsworth and Lisa G. Horning, New Public Disclosure Rules Present
Opportunities and Challenges to Exempt Organizations, 23 Exempt Org Tax Rev 55, 55-56
(1999) (detailing penalties for failure to comply). See IRC § 6104(d), codified at 26 USCA
§ 6104(d) (West Supp 1999).
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ity, however, need not provide the information if it is "widely avail-
able."71 Information from Form 990 is in the process of being posted
on the web," which may trigger the "widely available" caveat per se.8'
This may help increase the "visibility and scrutiny" of charitable ac-
tivities.' Form 990 and its accompanying Schedule A require the dis-
closure of extensive information on revenues, expenses, balance sheet
accounts, professional fundraising fees, and compensation of employ-
ees and independent contractors.n The Internal Revenue Code has the
effect of regulating the form that many charitable organizations take.4
Moreover, while the Federal Trade Commission is not involved in
general charitable oversight, it can pursue "charitable" violators of
federal laws. ' The FTC has occasionally, in conjunction with state offi-
cials, sued charities accused of fraud and misrepresentation.
There have been proposals in the past to expand the role of the
federal government in the area of charities regulation. In 1977, the
United States Treasury, under the leadership of John H. Filer, con-
ducted a large-scale study of the nonprofit sector and recommended
establishing a national supervisory agency." However, the Carter ad-
ministration was not interested in establishing such an agency.!
In the last decade, members of Congress have proposed bills to
require exempt organizations to disclose the percentage of funds
raised that are spent on exempt purposes, and have introduced bills to
require professional fundraisers to reveal the percent of the money
they collected that went to fundraising costs.' These were attempts to
enact, through the Internal Revenue Code, the requirements in state
79 IRC§6104(d)(4).
80 See <http'/.www.guidestar.orglnewslfeatures/990status.html> (visited Feb 12, 2000),
which is in the process of posting information from Form 990 on its web site. Form 990s for some
organizations are currently available.
81 "Widely available" is not defined in the Code, but is expected to be defined through
regulations. Ellingsworth and Homing, 23 Exempt Org Tax Rev at 56 n 6 (cited in note 78).
82 Id at 56.
83 Form 990-PF requires the disclosure of similar information for private foundations.
84 For example, the Code limits the nature of qualifying organizations, does not permit
lobbying or participation in a political campaign, and does not allow net earnings to be distrib-
uted to private shareholders or individuals. IRC § 501(c)(3). Further, the Code limits the terms
on which charities may lend money, buy property, and pay compensation. IRC § 503(b).
85 Federal Trade Commission, Facts for Consumers: Charitable Donation$: Give or Take,
available online at <http:llwww'ftc.govfbcplconlinelpubsltmarkgcharity'pdf> (visited Mar 17,
2000).
86 For links to six cases, see <http:/lwww.ftc.govlbcplconlineledcamslgivinglindex.html>
(visited Mar 17, 2000).
87 Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Commentary on Commission
Recommendations, in 1 Filer Commission Research Papers at 38 (cited in note 19).
88 Peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector and Other Essays on Philanthropy,
Voluntarism, and Nonprofit Organizations 78 (Johns Hopkins 1992).
89 See Espinoza, 64 S Cal L Rev at 672 & n 317 (cited in note 19).
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solicitation statutes struck down by the Court in Riley.4 However, one
commentator has argued that giving charitable oversight to tax au-
thorities would "complicate regulation and undermine constitutional
interests.'"'
In 1990, Representative Luken introduced a bill to authorize the
FTC to regulate charitable fundraising." The bill was referred to
committee, but no further action was taken on it. While there have
been recent proposals to amend the Internal Revenue Code as it re-
lates to charities, there have not been recent attempts to expand fed-
eral government oversight of charities. Thus, the federal government's
efforts toward regulating charitable institutions remain limited to
those reflected in the Internal Revenue Code.
II. THE INTERNEr JURISDICTIoN, DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE,
AND FEDERAL POLICY
The Internet has posed new and complex questions for lawmak-
ers and the courts. There are approximately 101 million Internet users
in the United States.9 It is difficult to determine the identity of a per-
son accessing the Internet, 5 although commentators have argued that
improvements in technology may alleviate this problem.4 To date,
there are no reported cases concerning online charitable solicitation
and registration, although the issue is of great interest in the nonprofit
community given the rapid spread of web-based fundraising.
90 See text accompanying notes 54-58.
91 Espinoza, 64 S Cal L Rev at 673 (cited in note 19).
92 Fair Fundraising Act of 1990, HR 3964, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 6,1990), in 136 Cong
Rec H 298 (Feb 6,1990).
93 See, for example, Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1997,
HR 2604,105th Cong, 2d Sess (Oct 2,1997), in 143 Cong Rec H 8320 (Oct.3,1997); Charity Em-
powerment Act of 1999, S 997, 106th Cong, 1st Sess (May 11, 1999), in 145 Cong Rec S 5036
(May 11, 1999).
94 Leslie Cauley, William Boston, and Gautam Naik, Deutsche Telekom Sets $3 Billion Ca-
ble Deal, Wall St J A21 (Feb 22,2000).
95 See Reno vACLU, 521 US 844,855-56 & n 20 (1997). "No single organization controls
any membership in the Web, nor is there any centralized point from which individual Web sites
or services can be blocked from the Web." Id at 853.
96 See Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1218, 1227 (cited in note 20) (noting that Internet
providers can already achieve significant control over information flows, and advances in filter-
ing and identification technology promise to improve this).
97 For example, there are now multiple books available instructing nonprofits on how best
to use the web for fundraising. See, for example, Michael W. Johnston, The Nonprofit Guide to
the Internet: How to Survive and Thrive (Wiley 2d ed 1999); Gary B. Grant, The Wilder Nonprofit
Field Guide to Fundraising on the Internet (Amherst H. Wilder Foundation 1999). Additionally,
an online list-serv devoted to accountability issues for nonprofits using electronic communica-
tions has generated much discussion on this topic. See <http://www.bway.netl-hbograd/cyb-
acc.html> (visited Mar 18, 2000) (containing a link to archives of such discussions).
Registration Requirements for Online Charities
This Part will first address the courts' treatment of the assertion
of personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts in the forum state.
Under the traditional tests for personal jurisdiction, it seems likely
that an active online solicitation will subject the solicitor to personal
jurisdiction. This Part will then address the dormant Commerce
Clause concerns. While the dormant Commerce Clause applies to
nonprofit organizations, the courts have routinely upheld solicitation
statutes despite dormant Commerce Clause challenges. Further, while
the dormant Commerce Clause applies to the Internet, this does not
imply that states have no authority to regulate Internet activities. Fi-
nally, this Part notes that while the federal government has evinced
some intent to regulate the Internet exclusively, this intent remains
controversial and undecided. States should (and can) legally apply
their solicitation (and other) existing laws to the Internet in order to
protect their legitimate interests and those of their citizens.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
In order for a state to enforce its laws against online solicitors
who do not register, it must be able to obtain jurisdiction over them.'
While the courts' decisions in this area have not been completely con-
sistent, in all likelihood a state would be able to obtain jurisdiction
over online solicitors." Under International Shoe v Washington,"+ for a
forum to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must
have "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that exercising ju-
risdiction would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice."' The Court has elaborated on the personal jurisdic-
tion inquiry further in recent years. Under the purposeful availment
test first laid out in Asahi Metal Industries v Superior Court,'" a
threshold inquiry in the determination of personal jurisdiction is
whether the defendant has purposefully availed him or herself of the
forum state.'03
98 Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1216-17 (cited in note 20) (noting that a state can only
regulate activity insofar as it can enforce its laws, and that it can only enforce its laws against an
entity with no local presence if it can obtain personal jurisdiction over the entity and get a de-
fault judgment).
99 "Active" solicitors here refers to web sites that specifically request contributions. Web
sites that are simply informational or are advertisements may fall under a different rubric. See
the discussion in this Part.
100 326 US 310 (1945).
101 Id at 316.
102 480 US 102,108-09 (1987). Although only a plurality supported the Asahi holding, the
Court later affirmed the use of this test in Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462,472-75
(1985).
103 Asahi, 480 US.at 108-09; Burger King, 471 US at 472.
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Courts'. and commentators... frequently have addressed the issue
of whether an individual or organization whose only contact with the
forum state is a web site nevertheless may be subject to personal ju-
risdiction there. Courts have applied the personal jurisdiction tests to
Internet-only contacts with varying results. In a number of cases,
courts have found personal jurisdiction over defendants based on the
simple fact that the defendants' web sites were accessed in the forum
state.'9 Other courts have found personal jurisdiction to lie when the
defendants sell a product over the Internet that individuals purchase
in the forum state. Knowingly advertising on a web site and receiv-
ing publicity and contributions as a result may qualify as purposeful
availment under the Asahi test, subjecting one to the court's jurisdic-
tion.'9 However, if items are not available for purchase in the forum
state from the web site then jurisdiction may not be proper.19
Despite some of the preceding cases, most courts adjudicating the
issue of personal jurisdiction have required something more than the
mere accessibility of a web site in the forum state to assert personal
jurisdiction."" A web site that actively solicits donations, rather than
passively exists as an informational site, seems likely to cross this
threshold, and to provide the minimum contacts sufficient to support
104 See notes 106-109.
105 See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sover-
eignty, 5 Ind J Global Legal Stud 475,485-86 (1998) (casting doubt on the idea that a web site
alone could give rise to personal jurisdiction); Lori Irish Bauman, Personal Jurisdiction and
InternetAdvertising, 14 Computer Law 1 (Jan 1997) (analyzing cases upholding personal jurisdic-
tion claims based on web sites); Charles H. Fleischer, Will the InternetAbrogate Territorial Limits
on Personal Jurisdiction?, 33 Tort & Ins L J 107 (1997) (contending that a web site should not
subject site owners to personal jurisdiction); Stephen Wilske and Teresa Schiller, International
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 Fed Commun L J 117
(1997) (discussing different potential jurisdictional restrictions on state regulation).
106 Maritz, Inc v CyberGold, Inc, 947 F Supp 1328, 1333-34 (E D Mo 1996) (having a web
site that infringes a trademark is equivalent to committing a tortious act in the forum state,
which is a basis for jurisdiction under state law); Inset Systems; Inc v Instruction Set, Inc, 937 F
Supp 161, 164 (D Conn 1996) (having a web site that is continuously available to Connecticut's
10,000 Internet access sites meets the requirements of Connecticut's long-arm statute, which al-
lows for jurisdiction over claims arising from business solicited in the state if the company has
repeatedly solicited business in the state).
107 See Zippo Manufacturing Co v Zippo Dot Com, Inc, 952 F Supp 1119,1126-27 (W D Pa
1997) (selling passwords to 3,000 Pennsylvania subscribers constitutes purposeful availment).
108 Heroes, Inc v Heroes Foundation, 958 F Supp 1, 3 (D DC 1996) (finding that web page
solicitation combined with newspaper advertisement created minimum contacts with the District
of Columbia).
109 Bensusan Restaurant Corp v King, 937 F Supp 295,299 (S D NY 1996) (holding that web
page that allegedly infringed on a trademark did not amount to committing a tortious act in the
forum state and was not an act directed purposefully toward the forum state); Hearst Corp v
Goldberger, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 2065, *1 (S D NY 1997) (finding no jurisdiction over web site
owner in trademark infringement suit who had not contracted to sell or actually sold any goods
or service in the forum state).
110 See Goldsmith, 5 Ind J Global Legal Stud at 486 (cited in note 105).
1392 [67:1379
Registration Requirements for Online Charities
personal jurisdiction. For example, in Heroes, Inc v Heroes Founda-
tion," Heroes, Inc., a charitable organization, brought a trademark in-
fringement action against Heroes Foundation, another charity that
had allegedly infringed its trademark in HEROES and an accompany-
ing design. 2 The mark appeared on the defendant's web site and in an
advertisement that the defendant placed in the Washington Post.113 The
court found jurisdiction based on the newspaper ad and did not reach
the issue of whether the home page alone would subject the defen-
dant to jurisdiction.'" The court did lend importance to this contact
with the District of Columbia, and in particular to the fact that "the
defendant's home page explicitly solicits contributions.""
Jurisdiction over a soliciting web site may be proper on other
bases as well. As one court acknowledged, having a web site (whether
it raises money or not) may be analogous to having an ad in a national
magazine.16 In this instance, the court found that exercising jurisdic-
tion solely on this basis would violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the standards set out in International
Shoe. Nevertheless, the court explicitly acknowledged that personal
jurisdiction might be established in those instances where a defendant
actually does business on the Internet or where the user can exchange
information with the host web site."7 This analysis finds support in Su-
preme Court precedent, as the Court has found that regular circula-
tion of a magazine in the forum state provides jurisdiction in a libel
action based on the magazine's content."' Similarly, because web sites
are regularly available to residents in all states, courts could support
personal jurisdiction based on web site accessibility.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause and State Regulation
State regulation of charities and Internet transactions implicates
the dormant Commerce Clause. However, courts have upheld the ap-
plication of solicitation statutes in "real space" against dormant
111 958 F Supp I (D DC 1996).
112 Id at 2.
113 Id at 3-4.
114 Id at 4.
115 Id.
116 See Weber v Jolly Hotels, 977 F Supp 327, 333 (D NJ 1997) (finding that advertising
through a web site did not give the court personal jurisdiction).
117 Id.
118 Keeton v Hustler Magazin Inc, 465 US 770,773-74 (1984). While one lower court has
distinguished this case, Supreme Court precedent still clearly controls. See McDonough v Fallon
McElligot Inc, 40 USPQ2d 1826,1828-29 (S D Cal 1996) (distinguishing Keeton on the basis that
Keeton involved specific jurisdiction while McDonough involved general jurisdiction and reject-
ing notion that having a web site that is used by the forum's residents could subject the site
owner to personal jurisdiction in the forum).
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Commerce Clause challenges. Thus, although courts have yet to apply
existing state regulations to the Internet, states should be able to regu-
late online solicitations without violating the dormant Commerce
Clause.
1. Overview of the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Commerce Clause states that Congress has the power "[tio
regulate Commerce ... among the several States . . . ."", Congress has
the affirmative power to enact regulations affecting interstate com-
merce. 0 Even in the absence of congressional action, the Supreme
Court has found that states may not enact statutes that discriminate121
against or unduly burden interstate commerce. The courts have rec-
ognized this "negative" or "dormant" aspect of the Commerce Clause
for almost a century and a half...
Generally, state statutes may implicate the dormant Commerce
Clause in one of two ways. First, statutes that directly regulate or dis-
criminate against interstate commerce are unconstitutional." Second,
under Pike v Bruce Church, Inc," if a facially neutral state statute
"regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public inter-
est, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly ex-
cessive in relation to the putative local benefits."2 The Commerce
Clause seeks to avoid inconsistent and overlapping state regulation, as
well as economic protectionism by the states.
2. Dormant Commerce Clause and state regulation of charities
in "real space."
The Supreme Court has found that both the Commerce Clause
and the dormant Commerce Clause apply to nonprofit transactions.'
119 US Const Art 1, § 8, cl 3.
120 See Quill Corp v North Dakota, 504 US 298,309 (1992), citing Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US
(9 Wheat) 1, 31-32,39 (1824).
121 See New Energy Co ofIndiana v Limbach, 486 US 269,273-274 (1988).
122 See CTS Corp v Dynamics Corp ofAmerica, 481 US 69,87 (1987), citing Cooley v Board
of Wardens, 53 US (12 How) 299 (1852).
123 See American Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc v Pinellas County,
32 F Supp 2d 1308,1315 (M D Fla 1998) (concluding that county registration statute did not di-
rectly regulate interstate commerce), citing Healy v Beer Institute, 491 US 324, 336 (1989),
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp v New York State Liquor Authority, 476 US 573, 579 (1986), and
Edgar v MITE Corp, 457 US 624,642 (1982) (plurality).
124 397 US 137 (1970).
125 Id at 142.
126 See Healy, 491 US at 336-37; Brown-Forman, 476 US at 583-84.
127 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc v Town of Harrison, 520 US 564,584 (1997) ("We
see no reason why the nonprofit character of an enterprise should exclude it from the coverage
of either the affirmative or the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause"). The Court found that
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Accordingly, courts frequently have applied laws that regulate com-
merce to nonprofit organizations. I
While state regulation of out-of-state solicitors does result in
multiple jurisdictions regulating one charity, courts have found that
solicitation ordinances themselves do not violate the Commerce
Clause for several reasons. First, they do not regulate interstate com-
merce wholly outside the state. Second, they relate to legitimate gov-
ernment interests in protecting the public from fraud. Third, they are
not unduly burdensome in relation to their putative local benefits'
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that while solicitation is protected
under the First Amendment, states do have a legitimate interest in
regulating charities to protect both the charities and the public from
fraud as long as the regulation is narrowly tailored. " Various solicita-
tion statutes have survived Due Process and First Amendment chal-
lenges."'
When a state applies its registration requirements to an out-of-
state charity in the same way that it applies them to an in-state charity,
this does not raise the discriminatory concerns that are a central fea-
ture of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.n Given the facial
neutrality of most solicitation statutes, they should be analyzed under
the Pike' balancing test laid out at the beginning of this Part.'" In the
state-to-state context, given that not all states regulate fundraising
(though most do), there may be a concern that this places an undue
burden on charities in nonregulating states. However, the concerns are
the same as those that exist in real space.
3. Dormant Commerce Clause and the Internet.
Unsurprisingly, courts have found that the dormant Commerce
Clause applies to the Internet. The Internet, like a highway or rail-
Maine law, which provided favorable tax treatment to charities that primarily benefited in-state
residents would have clearly violated the dormant Commerce Clause if the law applied to for-
profit entities as well as to nonprofit entities.
128 See id at 583-84 (listing cases).
129 See American Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc v Pinellas County,
32 F Supp 2d 1308, 1315-17 (M D Fla 1998) (upholding county registration requirement);
American Target Advertising, Inc v Giani, 23 F Supp 2d 1303, 1309-11 (D Utah 1998), revd on
other grounds, 199 F3d 1241 (10th Cir 2000) (striking portions of law on First Amendment
grounds while affirming dismissal of Commerce Clause claims).
130 See Riley, 487 US at 788,792.
131 American Charities, 32 F Supp 2d at 1321, 1327-28 (involving facial Due Process and
First Amendment challenge).
132 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 US at 581 ("I[Dliscrimination [against out-of-state
consumers] is at the very core of activities forbidden by the dormant commerce clause").
133 See text accompanying notes 124-25.
134 See American Charities, 32 F Supp 2d at 1315-17 (upholding a solicitation ordinance af-
ter applying the Pike test).
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road, may be an instrument of interstate commerce and analyzed ac-
cordingly.'' Courts have found that Internet communications, in par-
ticular electronically mailed images via the Internet, constitute inter-
state commerce.'3 Courts have invalidated state provisions explicitly
aimed at regulating content on the Internet."7
4. State laws and the Internet.
At least thirteen states have passed new statutes regulating the
Internet. ' These have mainly aimed at content on the Internet, al-
though some have been tax bills.'" Some attorneys general, such as
Mike Hatch of Minnesota, have actively pursued what they consider
to be online violations of state law.'
However, while the Internet is a new medium, many existing
state laws still apply. Advertising laws, both state and federal, apply to141
ads on the Internet. State common law principles, such as trespass to
chattels, similarly apply to the Internet.'4
States should equally be able to apply their solicitation laws
online. Protection of consumers from fraud, the aim of solicitation
statutes, falls under state police powers and is a compelling local, in-
terest.'4' The possibilities for fraud are multiplied on the Internet-it is
inexpensive to establish a web page and is easy to reach a vast audi-
135 American Libraries Association v Pataki, 969 F Supp 160,161 (S D NY 1997).
136 In United States v Thomas, 74 F3d 701 (6th Cir 1996), cert denied, 519 US 820 (1996), the
court held that defendants who operated a subscription-only computer bulletin board from Cali-
fornia with obscene images were subject to jurisdiction in Tennessee when an undercover gov-
ernment agent subscribed and accessed the bulletin board from Tennessee. Id at 706-09. The
mailing of obscene images constituted interstate commerce under 18 USC § 1465, which prohib-
its transportation of obscene materials in interstate commerce. Id.
137 See, for example, ACLU v Johnson, 194 F3d 1149 (10th Cir 1999), which invalidated a
New Mexico law criminalizing dissemination by computer of material harmful to minors, in part
on Commerce Clause grounds.
138 See Christopher S.W. Blake, Note, Destination Unknown: Does the Internet's Lack of
Physical Situs Preclude State and Federal Attempts to Regulate It?, 46 Cleve St L Rev 129, 138
(1998).
139 See id.The federal Internet Tax Freedom Act has placed a moratorium on any new bills
taxing the internet. See discussion in Part II.C.
140 See Burk, 28 Conn L Rev at 1096 (cited in note 14).
141 David M. Eisenberg, Questions and Answers About Advertising on the Internet, 43 Prac
Law 79,80 (July 1997).
142 See America Online, Inc v IMS, 24 F Supp 2d 548,549-51 (E D Va 1998) (finding the de-
fendant, whose principal place of business was in California, guilty of trespass to chattels under
Virginia common law, based on mailing of unsolicited email messages whose origin was dis-
guised to subscribers of plaintiff, an Internet service provider located in the Eastern District of
Virginia). See also CompuServe Inc v Cyber Promotions, Inc, 962 F Supp 1015,1017 (S D Ohio
1997) (finding valid a state law prohibiting trespass to personal property in a claim based on
similar facts).
143 See Citizens for a Better Government, 444 US at 636 (stating that the Village did have an
interest in preventing fraud, but that the statute in this instance did not protect that interest).
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ence. While state regulation of Internet solicitation implicates the
dormant Commerce Clause, such regulation does not violate it and
remains justified by important state interests.
C. Federal Assertion of Control over the Internet?
Both Congress and the President have evinced an intent to con-
trol certain aspects of the Internet on a national, rather than a state,
level.1" While this indicates that federal regulation may replace state
regulatory efforts directed toward the Internet, this is by no means
clear. For example, the Communications Decency Act of 1996 sought
to regulate pornography on the Internet and to limit the access of mi-
nors to such information."s Although the Supreme Court struck down
provisions of the Act that prohibited knowing transmittal of obscene,
indecent, patently offensive, or sexual images or descriptions to mi-
nors as violative of First Amendment free speech rights, ' the Court
did leave open the possibility of future Internet regulation." Further,
the Internet Tax Freedom Act ("ITFA") has placed a moratorium un-
til October of 2001 on new discriminatory state sales taxes on
e-commerce and the levying of new Internet access taxes."' Signifi-
cantly, the ITFA "prohibits state and local governments from requir-
ing remote electronic merchants to collect sales tax based solely on
the ability of a consumer to access that merchant's computer server"
and "prevents states from imposing taxes solely because a remote
seller displays content on or processes orders through an Internet ser-
vice provider's out-of-state computer server."'49
The ITFA has been highly controversial. State and local officials
remain greatly concerned that the Act will become permanent, result-
ing in a loss of revenues.n Advocates of e-commerce feel that an elec-
tronic tax will burden online transactions, discourage e-consumers,
144 See Blake, Note, 46 Cleve St L Rev at 149 (cited in note 138).
145 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104,110 Stat 133 (1996), codified
at 47 USC § 223 (Supp 1996).
146 Reno v ACLU, 521 US 844, 859-60, 874-79 (1997) (striking down Act as vague and
overbroad).
147 Id at 863 n 30 ("According to [the District Judge], [the Internet's] characteristics and the
rest of the District Court's findings 'lead to the conclusion that Congress may not regulate inde-
cency on the Internet at all.' Because [plaintiffs] do not press this argument before this Court, we
do not consider it. [Plaintiffs] also do not dispute that the Government generally has a compel-
ling interest in protecting minors from 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' speech.") (citation
omitted).
148 Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub L No 105-277,Title XI, codified at 47 USCA § 151 (West
1998).
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and violate the Commerce Clause.' However, the Advisory Commis-
sion on Electronic Commerce has noted the need to "be respectful of
sovereignty of state and local jurisdictions..'... While Congress has ad-
dressed taxes and indecent content on the Internet, it has not passed
legislation providing for comprehensive federal control of the Inter-
net. It has not addressed many aspects of the Internet, including solici-
tation laws. Thus, there has been no preemption of state solicitation
laws as applied to the Internet.
Some courts have described the Internet as an instrument of in-
terstate commerce that should be subject to exclusive federal over-
sight.'3 In the past, other new technologies that transcended geo-
graphical boundaries have confronted the Court. The Court initially
saw such technologies as "instruments" of commerce and struck down
regulation by the states; however, the Court later backpedaled and
upheld state regulation. ' m Further, as noted previously in this Part,
other courts have applied existing state laws to the Internet. There is
not currently exclusive federal control in this area, and it remains un-
clear what direction it will take.
III. SUPPORT FOR STATE REGULATION
While some commentators have argued that the Internet cannot
be regulated at all, this argument has serious flaws. This Part notes
that Internet communications involve real people and that the con-
cerns that motivate regulation in real space are just as valid in cyber-
space. Further, this Part argues that allowing the federal government
to regulate Internet solicitations would expand the federal govern-
ment's role in all charitable oversight, either through duplicating state
efforts or through preempting state regulation. Duplication is admin-
istratively burdensome and unnecessary. Preemption is undesirable, as
the protection of consumers from fraud that motivates solicitation
laws is a state police power and is closer to the heart of state, rather
than federal, government concerns.
151 Id.
152 Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce, Issues and Policy Options Paper: Final
Draft Submitted to the Commission from the Report Drafting Subcommittee 12-3-99, available
online at <http//:www.ecommerce.commission.org/document/issuesPO.pdf> (visited Mar 6,
2000).
153 See, for example, American Libraries Association v Pataki, 969 F Supp 160,182 (S D NY
1997) ("The Internet, like [ ] rail and highway traffic ... requires a cohesive national scheme of
regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations."); ACLU v Johnson,
194 F3d 1149, 1162 (10th Cir 1999) ("[C]ertain types of commerce have been recognized as re-
quiring national regulation .... The Internet is surely such a medium.").
154 See James E. Gaylord, Note, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet: Letting the
Dormant Commerce Clause Lie, 52 Vand L Rev 1095,1117-21 (1999) (describing the history of
the Court's treatment of the telegraph).
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A. Arguments against a Complete Lack of Public Regulation
Some commentators have argued that the absence of traditional
geographic boundaries in cyberspace indicates that it is impossible for
states to apply territorially based notions of the law to the Internet
and that states should instead defer to self-regulation online.' How-
ever, the Internet still involves "people in real space in one jurisdic-
tion communicat[ing] with people in real space in another jurisdic-
tion ' There is a need for public regulation of the Internet in addi-
tion to private ordering."' Absent public ordering, private ordering
may arise that is inefficient and not in the public interest.
States' concerns about fraud being perpetrated against their citi-
zens are no less legitimate in the Internet context than in real space.
Such concerns may be even greater online given the low start-up costs
and the broad audience that a solicitation may reach. Despite con-
cerns about the difficulty of locating users geographically on the
Internet, it is "feasible and constitutional" for the law to require the
altering of the Internet's code to enable identification of users by
various criteria,' which could include geographic locale.
B. Arguments against Federal Regulation of Online Solicitation
Allowing federal regulation of Internet solicitations would likely
mean expanding the overall federal role in the oversight of charities.
Efforts in the past to expand the federal role in this area have proven
unsuccessful.'9 The IRS is the only government agency that collects in-
formation on charities. Expanding the role of the IRS in charitable
oversight is undesirable. As one commentator notes: "Moving the
oversight of charity to tax authorities will complicate regulation and
undermine the protection of constitutional interests."'' Other com-
mentators have criticized efforts to establish a uniform federal chari-
ties law, arguing that there is no similar provision or proposal for for-
profit corporations.'
Regulation of solicitation would require the federal government
to register charitable solicitors, monitor their solicitations, and track
down and punish violators. It would be duplicative and unnecessarily
155 Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1367 (cited in note 21).
156 Goldsmith, 5 Ind J Global Legal Stud at 476 (cited in note 105).
157 Goldsmith, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1213-16 (cited in note 20) (discussing possible usage of
public laws to supplement private ordering).
158 See Lessig, 113 Harv L Rev at 515-18 (cited in note 20). While doing so could raise seri-
ous privacy concerns, the government could also "subsidize architectures for privacy" on the
Internet in order to address this. Id at 544.
159 See discussion in Part I.B.
160 Espinoza, 64 S Cal L Rev at 673 (cited in note 19).
161 See, for example, Brody, 41 Vill L Rev at 497 (cited in note 29).
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costly for both the state and federal government to do so. The inter-
ests in each case (protection of consumers from fraud) remain the
same. Nothing would be added by federal regulation. Although there
have been past (unsuccessful) recommendations for the federal gov-
ernment to regulate charitable solicitation, at least some of the condi-
tions that prompted these recommendations have changed.16
It is also undesirable for federal regulation to preempt state regu-
lation. It is a well established principle that state police powers en-
compass the protection of citizens from fraud.'66 There is no general
federal police power.'" While the federal government can regulate in-
terstate commerce, and nonprofit transactions fall under this power,
state solicitation and registration statutes still pass the Pike balancing
test.' Thus, state interests in protecting against fraud can outweigh
burdens on interstate commerce.
The FTC already has authority over unfair and deceptive trade
practices involving interstate commerce.' While this does not gener-
ally include authority over nonprofits, it can on an ad hoc basis. 7 Fed-
eral interests in consumer protection may thus be taken into account
in ways other than requiring federal registration of charitable solici-
tors.
While the federal government has evinced some intent to control
the Internet on a national level, it has never set up a national supervi-
sory or regulatory agency. And, as one commentator notes: "There are
few who believe that another agency with additional resources is a
sufficient cure for any social ill." '
Some courts have found that the Internet is an instrument of in-
terstate commerce, and as such should be subject exclusively to fed-
eral control.' These cases have struck down new laws that were aimed
162 See Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Giving in America: Toward
a Stronger Voluntary Sector 177 (Treasury Dept 1975). The Commission recommended federal
regulation of charitable solicitation, noting that only twenty-five states regulated solicitations
and that the coverage and scope of the laws varied widely. However, today nearly forty states
regulate solicitation, and the laws are more comprehensive and uniform due to the Model Act.
163 Don F. Vacarro, Validity and Application of Governmental Limitation on Permissible
Amount or Proportion of Fundraising Expenses or Administrative Costs of Charitable Organiza-
tions, 15 ALR 4th 1163 (1982).
164 Larry McInnis, The Municipal Management of Emergencies: The Houston Plan, 4 Tex
Forum on Civ Lib & Civ Rts 139,143 (1999).
165 See text accompanying notes 124-25.
166 See 15 USC § 45 (1994).
167 William Meade Fletcher, 10A Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corporations § 4984 (West
1999).
16s Fishman, 34 Emory L J at 671 (cited in note 26) (referring specifically to the case of
nonprofit corporations).
169 See ACLU v Johnson, 194 F3d 1149,1160-63 (10th Cir 1999) (striking down New Mex-
ico statute that criminalized dissemination of material harmful to minors by computer as viola-
tive of the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause); American Libraries Association v
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specifically at the Internet. However, the courts have upheld the ap-
plication of existing state laws to the Internet."" Arguments that the
Internet is national in nature can just as easily be countered by argu-
ments that the Internet is international in nature, and that the United
States government should not be able to regulate it either. We are
then left with a regime of no regulation, which is unacceptable.'
Given the broad definition of solicitation and the fact that solicita-
tions can be deemed to occur where they are received, existing state
laws can easily encompass Internet solicitation.
Similarly, in cases of gambling on the Internet, courts have found
the gambling to occur where the bet is placed rather than where the
web site is hosted, and to be illegal under state law."2 The Internet's
status as a new medium does not alter the basic features of a solicita-
tion: a request by a real-space organization for money that is received
by a real-space state resident.
This Part does not argue that there should be no national policy
or regulation of the Internet. However, the arguments for state regula-
tion of solicitation remain as strong in cyberspace as they are in real
space, and there is no good reason for the federal government to ab-
rogate this or the many other state consumer protection (and crimi-
nal) laws that should legitimately apply online.
C. Arguments for State Regulation
It is entirely logical and desirable for states to apply their laws as
described above. An individual prohibited from committing trespass
to chattels (or violations of other state common or statutory laws) in
real space should not be able to evade the law by using the Internet.
Although the Internet may be an instrument of interstate commerce,
this does not imply that the federal government can or should pre-
empt all state laws that might apply. Both state and federal govern-
ments have applied their existing laws to gambling on the Internet in
order to protect their legitimate interests.7 ' There is no indication that
federal law will preempt state law in the online gambling context. In
fact, "in no case does an activity characterized by a state interest be-
come an activity devoid of state interest simply because it has been re-
Pataki, 969 F Supp 160, 161 (S D NY 1997) (striking down similar New York statute on Com-
merce Clause grounds).
170 See note 142 and accompanying text.
171 See discussion in Part Ifl.A.
172 People v World Interactive Gaming Corp, 1999 NY Misc LEXIS 425, *1-2, *4-5 (NY Sup
Ct July 22,1999).
173 For a general discussion of the application of state and federal gambling laws to the
Internet, see Michael Schwartz, The Internet Gambling Fallacy Craps Out, 14 Berkeley Tech L J
1021 (1999).
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located to cyberspace."' 74 We live under a federal government of lim-
ited powers: "The powers delegated by the [ ] Constitution to the fed-
eral government are few and defined. Those which ... remain in the
state governments are numerous and indefinite."''.. Despite broad
readings of the Commerce Clause power in the past, the Court has re-
cently indicated that in some instances Congress may go too far.'
While there are concerns that state regulation of Internet solicitation
(and Internet communications in general) may lead to overlapping
and thus burdensome regulation, "we already live in a world of multi-
ple, overlapping, contradictory, and oftentimes contested sovereign-
ties.'" While the Internet may complicate this, we already deal with
the problem in real space and can do so in cyberspace.
While the federal government also has an interest in protecting
United States citizens from fraud, state governments are by nature
smaller and closer to their citizens, and thus have a more particular-
ized interest in this area. State police powers are broad,"8 while the
federal government's police powers are narrow.'" States should be
able to retain their police powers in cyberspace. '8,
One of the principal concerns with the Internet is that entities
cannot limit where their cyber-information is accessed, and thus can-
not array their conduct in order to avoid regulation. However, online
solicitors know (or hope) that they will obtain the benefits of raising
money in any jurisdiction. Correspondingly, they know that there are
burdens that accompany solicitation, given that almost all states re-
quire registration. If an organization obtains the benefits of contacts
with residents of the forum state, then it should have to bear the bur-
174 Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and Supporting a New
Frontier, 11 Harv J L & Tech 429, 451 (1998) (stating that while some state interests may be re-
duced in cyberspace, calling for some federal preemption, states should be able to regulate par-
ticular areas).
15 United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 552 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School
Zones Act as beyond Congress's powers), citing Federalist 45 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed,
The Federalist Papers 292 (Mentor 1961).
176 Lopez, 514 US at 552.
177 Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertari-
anism, National Sovereignty, "Global" Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 Ind J Global Legal
Stud 443,443 (1998).
178 The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all powers not expressly delegated to the
federal government. US Const Amend X. "[L]ocal governments are best able to monitor exempt
organizations to ensure that they provide a public benefit," as they are closer to their citizens
and citizens' interests. Developments in the Law: Nonprofit Corporations, 105 Harv L Rev 1578,
1626 (1992).
179 See Part III.B.
180 Gaylord, Note, 52 Vand L Rev at 1095 (cited in note 154) (arguing that states should be
able to do so, and that the Court's concerns with the extraterritorial effects of state regulation
under the dormant Commerce Clause are more properly seen as "nexus" concerns).
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dens as well."' State regulation can be seen as a cost of doing business
and obtaining benefits from the forum state, as well as a driving force
behind the development of filtering technology.ln Further, internet
communications are transmitted via telephone and cable lines. States
can already regulate solicitations that reach their state via these
means.
Professor Steven Salbu has argued that the characteristics of the
Internet only require uniform (federal) control if they meet the fol-
lowing three criteria: (1) technological considerations requiring the
compatibility of technologies; (2) the likelihood of serious Internet
encumbrance through fractionalized regulation; and (3) the need for
unified federal technologies to support federal policy goals and pro-
grams. State regulation of online solicitation would have no impact
on the compatibility of technologies. Further, regulation is not likely
to be fractionalized as states are already quite uniform in their chari-
table solicitation and reporting requirements. Finally, while the federal
government collects information on charities for the purpose of tax
exemption, there is no federal program as such implicated here. The
federal policies of encouraging charitable deductions, ensuring that
only legitimate charities receive exemptions, and requiring financial
information to facilitate this will not be implicated by state regulation
here.
State regulation meets two further standards articulated by
Salbu: Internet technology leaves traditional state concerns (such as
fraud) intact, and abandonment of local police power could create a
serious enforcement gap.u In order to facilitate state regulation, states
can develop model codes relating to the Internet.n The Model Solici-
tation Act already in existence could aid such efforts.
Of the thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia that re-
quire registration, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia al-
ready use the uniform registration form developed by NAAG and
NASCO.' Requiring charities to register in all states where their web
site is available would not be unduly burdensome, given this shared
181 Goldsmith, 5 Ind J Global Legal Stud at 485 (cited in note 105) ("From the perspective
of the regulating jurisdiction, the content provider is knowingly sending information into a juris-
diction; like all persons who do the same in real space, the content provider benefits from this in-
state activity, is deemed to know the law of the territory, and is subject to penalties for non-
compliance (assuming that enforcement is possible).").
182 Id at 489-90 (arguing that states should be able to force a service provider to comply
with state gambling laws).
183 Salbu, 11 Harv J L & Tech at 465-70 (cited in note 174).
184 Id at 470-71.
185 Id at 478.
186 <http://www.nonprofits~org/library/gov/urs/o_appndx.htm#alabama> (visited Apr 3,
2000).
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registration form. Moreover, it would provide significant local benefits
in terms of availability of information to the public and oversight of
potential fraud. State interests in preventing fraud do not simply dis-
appear because a transaction occurs over the Internet. The main ar-
guments against state regulation-that it is technologically difficult,
potentially burdensome, or unconstitutional-do not hold water.
IV. PROPOSALS
While state regulation of charitable solicitation is preferable to
federal regulation, current state regulation is less than perfect. At least
one writer has alleged that "[a]ll commentators on the subject agree
that there is inadequate supervision of nonprofit corporations."
'm
There have been proposals at the state level to establish a formal
"stakeholder" provision with regard to nonprofits, and to grant these
stakeholders the rights to sue nonprofits, to access information about
nonprofits, and to elect the board of directors or trustees. M However,
others note that granting members of the public the right to sue would
generate excess litigation and would create a large, shifting, and un-
certain group of plaintiffs."' There have been other proposals to create
both state and federal charities boards, but "[t]he hard reality is that
governments do not want to take over the business of running chari-
ties.""'
The Internet does require changes in the way that states currently
regulate solicitation in order to make Internet regulation administra-
tively feasible and minimally burdensome. A number of states have
already adopted the Model Act's provision that allows for acceptance
of a copy of a filing in another state in lieu of a separate filing.' Most
states use the uniform registration form developed by NAAG and
NASCO. ' Charities can easily determine which states demand regis-
tration and what the registration requirements are through the non-
187 Fishman, 34 Emory L J at 668 (cited in note 26).
188 Stakeholders would include consumers, donors, and sponsors. This policy would be ef-
fected mainly by state-level Offices for Nonprofit Organizations ("ONO"), and the Commis-
sioner of the ONO would be elected in a manner similar to judges. Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen,
4 Nonprofit Management and Leadership at 395,408-09 (cited in note 4).
189 Fishman, 34 Emory L J at 670-71 (cited in note 26) (arguing instead that "[e]xpanding
the use of relators could complement attorney general enforcement yet avoid the dangers of
broadening standing by members of the public" and defining a relator as "a party who may or
may not have a direct interest in a transaction, but is permitted to institute a proceeding in the
name of the people when that right to sue resides solely in the attorney general").
190 Brody, 41 Vill L Rev at 497-99 (cited in note 29).
191 Wilson, 12 Prob & Prop at 53 (cited in note 36).
192 See <http:lwww.nonprofits.orgllibrary/govlurs/> (visited Mar 4,2000).
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profits.org web site.'" Further moves toward uniformity in registration
should continue in order to simplify registration for online solicitors.
In order to do so, information from the uniform registration
forms should be placed in a database coordinated and controlled by
state officials and available to all the states.' States could accept par-
ticipation in this database in lieu of separate filings. Charities would
have to indicate in which states they intend to solicit (all states if they
have a web site that they do not block or filter in any way), and each
state would receive automatic notification upon their registration.
While there is a cost to doing this, charging charities a higher fee for
this system may be cheaper than requiring charities to register sepa-
rately in all jurisdictions that require it. Current registration fees are
minimal;"" even a 100 or 200 percent increase would be bearable.
State laws also often exempt very small charities from registra-
tion.'" Truly small, local charities with web sites could be exempt from
a national database as well. Charities that do not wish to solicit na-
tionally via the web can continue with the current system and avoid
the imposition of higher registration fees. States already cooperate in
this area.n For example, state charities offices in New Hampshire,
New Mexico, and Oregon are collaborating with the Multi-State Filter
Project to allow electronic filing of IRS Form 990, which many states
require."" States could harness the web here as well, allowing charities
to register in the database via the Internet.
Charities can police themselves as well. Web sites can have dis-
claimers that donations will be accepted only from residents of par-
ticular jurisdictions. To enforce such a provision, charities can require
the presentation of an individual's home address prior to accepting a
contribution. If a charity does not accept donations online via credit
card, but instead offers a phone number or mailing address for web
surfers to use, the initial disclaimer could still be effective. While some
states define a solicitation to occur where it is received regardless of
whether a donation is actually made, changing this definition for
Internet solicitations might be one of the adaptations called for by
193 See <http:lwww.nonprofits.orgllibrary/gov/urslo-appndx.htm#alabama> (visited Apr 3,
2000) (providing overview of registration requirements of the thirty-eight states and the District
of Columbia that require registration).
194 States that do not currently accept the uniform form might choose to participate or
might choose to continue in a separate manner.
195 See, for example, Conn Gen Stat Ann § 21a-190b (requiring a twenty dollar filing fee for
organizations that register to solicit).
196 See, for example, NY Executive Law § 172-a(2)(d) (exempting charities that raise less
than $25,000 per year and do not use professional fundraisers).
197 The uniform registration forms are an example of this.
198 See <http.//www.bway.net-hbograd/highlights.html> (visited Mar 18,2000).
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web fundraising.'" States can amend their definitions of solicitation to
exclude Internet solicitations, as long as there is a specific disclaimer
stating in which states the charity does and does not solicit, and a
means of blocking contributions from the state's residents. Addition-
ally, future advances in technology may allow web site operators to
block access to a site entirely based on the geographic location of the
Internet user."° A charity could then avoid soliciting, and its accompa-
nying registration and reporting requirements, in designated locales.
In the context of taxes on Internet transactions, the Advisory
Commission on Electronic Commerce, created by the Internet Tax
Freedom Act, has recognized the need to "be respectful of sovereignty
of state and local jurisdictions," as well as the need for "state and local
governments [to] make every effort to simplify current sales and use
tax systems."" Similarly, with most states and some localities requiring
solicitors to register, simplification in registration could ease the bur-
den for charities while still encouraging charitable giving and protect-
ing legitimate state interests. Further moves toward uniform require-
ments could do so, as could a coordinated database.
Even if states do not adopt these simplifying schemes, states still
have authority to regulate online solicitors. But this does not imply
that states will become onerous regulators. State charities officials do
not believe that they should micromanage charities.2 They "do not
view themselves as the 'ultimate owners' of the underlying assets of all
charitable organizations, though they do represent the public, donors,
and beneficiaries in certain legal proceedings. '' 7
States have already lost one means of controlling fraud with the
loss of fundraising cost limits.m While we may desire a diverse and
competitive nonprofit sector, uncontrolled Internet fundraising may
harm charities more than it helps.' While charities may resist online
199 See, for example, Ark Code Ann 1198 § 1(13).
200 See Lessig, 113 Harv L Rev at 515-18 (cited in note 20) (discussing possible uses of
Internet protocol addresses to identify and screen users).
201 Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce, Issues and Policy Options Paper: Final
Draft Submitted to the Commission from the Report Drafting Subcommittee, 12-3-99 at 2, avail-
able online at <http://www.ecommercecommission.orgtdocument/issuesPO.pdf> (visited Mar 6,
2000).
202 Bograd, The Role of State Attorneys General at 5-6 (cited in note 32) (expressing views
of the directors of charities offices in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York, which are three
of the larger and better-staffed offices).
203 Id at 6.
204 See Citizens for a Better Government, 444 US at 622.
205 Espinoza, 64 S Cal L Rev at 667 (cited in note 19) ("An increasingly diverse and grow-
ing nonprofit marketplace was the goal of the Court in Citizens for a Better Government. And it
may be that increased competition and growth of the nonprofit sector will increase community
involvement, local volunteerism, and service provided to local beneficiaries who are not cur-
rently helped by large national charities or the government. On the other hand, these benefits
are likely to be offset by the loss of donor confidence and the scramble for market share con-
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regulation, state registration requirements might in fact help charities.
While most legitimate charities engage in "balanced" fundraising and
respect their donors,'" there have been many reports of abuses in the
nonprofit sector, which may discourage prospective donors." State
regulation may help to contain scandals and preserve public confin-
dence in charitable organizations.
CONCLUSION
While some commentators have criticized states' attempts to
regulate the Internet, this Comment demonstrates that state regula-
tion of online solicitations is not only feasible but the best solution to
the problems of charitable fraud. The advent of online fundraising has
multiplied the possibilities for charitable fundraising. This is mostly a
positive development-we desire a strong and vibrant nonprofit sec-
tor, and state and federal tax laws both encourage charitable dona-
tions. However, the possibilities for fraud are multiplied as well.
Traditional state police powers and interests in preventing con-
sumer fraud remain just as valid when applied to the new medium of
the Internet. States should not lose any power they have to protect
their citizens simply because the method of reaching their citizens has
changed.
Moreover, charities that obtain the benefits from soliciting in a
jurisdiction should have to bear the corresponding burdens. While we
may want to encourage the growth of the Internet and online com-
merce, state regulation has not been preempted in this area and
should not be.
This does not imply that no changes are necessary. Further uni-
formity in registration requirements and cooperation among states
can ease the burden on charities while still protecting legitimate state
interests. The proposals in this Comment are a start in that direction.
ducted through marginal fundraising").
206 Id at 654 ("Of course, most charities do not milk the public down to the last marginal
cent. Because they understand that giving may be chilled and because of their sincere commit-
ment to charitable causes, charities generally undertake balanced fundraising. This enables chari-
ties to efficiently maintain the interest of prior donors and, at the same time, provide for reason-
able growth in their donor base?') (footnote omitted).
207 Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 4 Nonprofit Management & Leadership at 394 (cited in
note 4).
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